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                  Abstract
Golden shares, or special rights1, as some prefer to say, are the 
inspiration – or at least the starting point - of several academic studies 
which  touch  a  broad  array  of  subjects:  such  studies  range  from 
literature  on  comparative  corporate  law,  to  studies  on  the  free 
movement  of  capital  within  the  European  Union,  studies  on  the 
governance of European integrated markets and studies on how far the 
European Court of Justice2 can go in reviewing the national corporate 
law of member-states. 
Because  –  as  we  will  mention  below  –  they  have  been 
considered  as  restrictions  on  the  free  movement  of  capital  in  the 
European Union, they also spark interest  because of their nature as 
control  enhancing  mechanisms,  or  mechanisms  which  allow  for 
economic interest and voting rights in a shareholding to be unbundled. 
In this sense, golden shares are also a deviation from the “One Share 
One Vote Principle”.
This  study will  consist  of  two  parts:  (i)  a  first  part,  which 
introduces the reader to the background of golden shares, analyses the 
existing types of golden shares and comments on some of the mostt 
important decisions by the ECJ on the subject and (ii) a shorter section 
which comments one the theory behind the one share one vote theory 
and calls the attention to certain perspectives which can be found in 
the existing literature on privatizations and state owned enterprises. 
Our purpose is to make an attempt to connect the subjects of 
golden shares and the one share one vote rule and demonstrate how 
the  first  subject  could  be  enriched  by  the  existing  studies  on  the 
proportionality  between  ownership  and  control  and  state  owned 
enterprises. 
1 The term “golden shares” is more familiar to us and as such it will the preferred expression troughout the length of 
this dissertation.
2 From hereinafter, we will refer to the European Court of Justice simply as ECJ.
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I 
Golden Shares
1. Privatization
As  we  first  mentioned,  golden  shares  are  a  product  of  the 
privatization movement that is generally understood to have initiated 
in the United Kingdom, during the govenment of Margaret Thatcher, 
even though at least two previous initiatives were carried out by the 
government  of  a  different  country  (we're  thinking  of  the  Federal 
Republic of Germany, whose government was responsibe for a public 
offerings of shares in Volkswagen, in 1961 and a similar offering of 
shares in VEBA, in 19653. The term “privatization” comes from the 
United Kingdom, where it  was adopted by Margaret Thatcher after 
being coined by Peter Drucker4).
Privatization  has  spread  all  over  the  globe,  as  several 
industrialized  and  developing  nations  alike  have  launched 
privatization programs, with varying degrees of success. In western 
Europe Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal and France come to mind; in 
eastern  Europe the  privatization  of  Russian  state-owned enterprises 
has been widely discussed and in Latin America divestment programs 
have  been  implemented  by  several  countries,  with  Chile  being 
notorious for being the first Latin American Country to implement a 
privatization program and Brazil deserving special attention because 
of the size of its economy5. 
 
2. “Denationalization”
This  privatization  movement,  which  some  consider  to  be 
arguably  the  largest  transfer  of  ownership  in  the  history  of  the 
3 William L. Megginson and Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39, no.2, 2001.
4 William L. Megginson and Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39, no.2, 2001.
5 William L. Megginson and Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: a Survey of Empirical Studies On Privatization, 
4-5 (2001).
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corporation6 was not more than a process of “denationalizaton” or the 
return of certain industries to the private sector, following a period on 
which ownership of enterprises by the state was seen favourably by 
many, who, amongst other reasons for nationalization, considered state 
ownership to be the solution for market failures.
This was certainly the case of the United Kingdom, where the 
second-half  of  the  1940's  was  a  period  of  intense  nationalization 
activity by the government7.  
In Continental  Europe privatizations were also preceeded by 
nationalizations  occurred  decades  before.  For  example  in  Spain, 
followiwng  a  period  on  which  telephone  service  was  originally 
operated by a number of private undertakings, which ran a network of 
several  local  small  concessions,  Compañia  Telefonica  Nacional  de 
España was incorporated as a private company, with Spanish as well 
as non-spanish investors. This company was then nationalized in 1945 
by Franco's regime (who bought a significant portion of the shares 
detained by the largest  foreign shareholder,  International  Telephone 
and Telegraph  Co,  thus  becoming the  company's  largest  individual 
shareholder)  and  brought  back  to  the  private  sector  in  a  gradual 
process  that  was  composed  of  three  successsive  public  offerings, 
ocurred in 1987, 1995 and 19978. 
Nationalization was often considered an adequate solution to 
the natural monopolies which exist in certain markets. 
Although  economists  do  not  completely  agree  on  a  single 
definition of what consitutes a natural monopoly, there is at least a 
general consensus that a natural monopoly implies the existence of  
pervasive economies of scale so that the highest level of efficiency is  
attained when production is centered in a single firm9. For a simple 
definition  of  natural  monopoly  highlighting  the  importance  of  this 
6 Bernardo Bortolotti & Maria Faccio, Government Control of Privatized Firms, ECGI Working Paper no. 40/2004. 
2004
7 For a description of this period and a theory on the motivations behind the large number of nationalizations see 
Robert Millward, The 1940's Nationalizations in Britain: Means to an End or the Means of Production?, The 
Economic History Review, New Series Vol. 50 No.2, 1997. 
8 Germà Bel and Francesc Trillas, Privatization, Corporate Control and Regulatory Reform: The case of Telefonica.
9 William W. Sharkey, The theory of natural monopoly, 13-20, 1982.
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charachteristic see, for example, Baumol et al. (1977): “By a natural  
monopoly we mean an industry whose cost function is such that no  
combination of several firms can produce an industry output vector as  
cheaply as it can be provided by a single supplier”10.
Natural monopolies are a result of the state of the technology 
employed in the production of a certain good or service. The level of 
technological  development  influences  the  cost  structure  of  certain 
industries by making the level of investment which is required to gain 
entrance to such industries so high that the most efficient outcome will 
only be obtained if a given firm manages to reduce its average cost of 
production by increasing the production scale to the highest possible 
level, which in turn will only be possible if the same firm is the only 
operator selling in the market11. 
This  situation,  will  inevitably lead to  problems caused by a 
misalignment of the interests of market consumers with the interests 
of the monopolist firm. Given the assumption that a monopolist firm 
cannot  be  expected  to  act  in  any  way  other  than  what  would  be 
rational in light of its interests, this lack of convergence will lead to a 
situation in which the monopolist produces sub-optimal levels of the 
product or service in question, from a social perspective12. 
Several arguments were then used to justify nationalization of 
firms operating in natural monopolies as an adequate solution for the 
abovementioned problems. 
We do not want to comment on the merit of these arguments – 
we believe that we do not possess the necessary knowledge to do so 
and that it would require extensive research which would exceed the 
scope of this study. Nonetheless, it appears that at least in the West 
these arguments for nationalization have been abandoned in favour of 
alternatives such as governmental regulation. 
Apart from motivations of economic nature – and regardless of 
the merit of the arguments of those who find state-ownership to be an 
10 W. J. Baumol, E .E. Bailey and R. D. Willig, Weak invisible hand theorems on the sustainability of multiproduct 
natural monopoly, American Economic Review 67 (1977).
11 João Confraria, Regulação e Concorrência – Desafios do Século XXI, 60-61, 2005.
12 João Confraria, Regulação e Concorrência – Desafios do Século XXI, 62, 2005.
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efficient solution for certain market failures – nationalizations were 
also  caused  by political  motivations:  the  nationalization  of  several 
enterprises in Portugal, imediately after the Carnation Revolution of 
1974,  and the  nationalization  of  enterprises  owned by nationals  of 
former colonial powers in post-colonial countries in Africa and Latin 
America are good examples of that13.
3. Golden shares as a consequence of reluctance to relinquish total 
control
Not  surprisingly,  when  the  previous  trend of  nationalization 
started  reversing,  governments,  at  the  very least,  were  reluctant  to 
fully renounce to the control they detained in what used to be state 
owned  enterprises  and,  through  various  mechanisms,  such  as 
ownership  pyramids,  dual-class  shares,  statutory  restrictions  and 
golden  shares  attempted  to  unwind  ownership  from  control  in 
privatized companies, letting go of the former, through direct sales or 
initial public offerings, but holding on to the latter14.
This  phenomenom  is  well  documented  by  Bortolotti  and 
Faccio, who define it as reluctant privatization: “We define reluctant  
privatization as the privatization of a SOE [State Owned Enterprise]  
characterized by the sale of equity without a corresponding transfer of  
control rights. This may happen because the government remains the  
largest  ultimate shareholder of  the company,  although it  no longer  
owns 100% of the stocks, or because it enjoys veto or special powers  
through its posession of so-called «golden shares»”15.
Amongst  such  mechanisms  employed  by  governments  to 
withold control in privatized companies, golden shares can be found 
frequently,  specially in companies in which the government did not 
make  use  of  other  tactics  to  esure  that  it  remains  the  largest 
13 On the nationalization of enterprises owned foreigners in former colonies see William L. Megginson and Jeffry M. 
Netter, From State to Market: a Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, 3, 2001 and J. Frederick Truitt, 
Expropriation of Foreign Investment: Summary of the Post World war II Experience of American and British 
Investors in the Less Developed Countries, Journal of International Business Studies,Vol.1., No.2 (1970).
14 See, for example, Erika Szyzczak, Golden Shares and Market Governance, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 
29(3), 255, 2002.
15 Bernardo Bortolotti, Mara Faccio, Reluctant Privatization, Center for Economic Institutions Working Paper Series, 
No. 2006-5, 2006.
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shareholder  or  that  it  retains  a  significant  level  of  “traditional” 
influence, as documented by the same authors.
In 2004, the European Commission carried out a survey with 
the  intention  to  evaluate  the  siuation  of  golden  shares  and  special 
rights in the European Union, whose results were made public in its 
2005 report on special rights in privatised companies in the enlearged 
Union16. 
The Commission identified golden shares in 141 companies, 
covering  a  broad  array  of  sectors  such  as  telecommunications, 
electricity,  gas, energy, postal  services, banking and insurance.  This 
number may appear impressive but, according to the Commission, it 
represents a reduction of golden shares in the European Union when 
compared  with  the  figueres  which  were  found  in  1997,  when  it 
conducted a similar survey following its communication on intra-EU 
investment from the same year17, at least as regards the member-states 
which were already a part of the Union before the 2004 enlargement18.
For the sake of rigour, it must be said that it is possible that a 
number of the golden shares which were identified by the Commission 
do not exist anymore, either because they were abolished as a result of 
unfavourable  ECJ decisions  or  infringement  proceedings  conducted 
by  the  Commission  or  because  member-states  have  voluntarilty 
abolished  them  –  according  to  the  2005  Commission  report  the 
extinction  of  several  special  rights  was  already planned for  by the 
respective member-states -, something which we are not able to verify. 
Nonetheless,  it  appears  to  us  that  they still  are  widely used in  the 
European Union and will not disappear completely in the immediate 
future, preventing this study from becoming obsolete all too soon.
4. Different configurations of special rights
Special  rights  of  states  in  privatized  companies  may  exist 
under different forms and confer different powers to the government. 
16 European Commission, Speccial Rights in privatised companies in the enlarged Union – a decade full of 
developments, Commission Staff Working Document, 2005.
17 European Commission, Communication on certain legal aspects concerning intra-EU investment, OJ 1997 C 220/15.
18 European Commission, Speccial Rights in privatised companies in the enlarged Union – a decade full of 
developments, Commission Staff Working Document, 19, 2005.
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In some member-states, the adoption of one method to confer special 
rights to the governent in detriment of others is merely an option and a 
matter of preference. In others, however, legislation requires certain 
approaches to be followed in order for the government to be granted 
special rights in a company.
A first distinction can be made between special rights which 
grant to governments a specific influence in company decisions and 
special rights which are aimed at guaranteeing that governments have 
a word in what concerns ownership structure. A second distinction is 
justified to separate special rights which are granted on the basis of the 
general company law of a member-state and special rights which rest 
upon  special  legislation  specifically  enacted  to  grant  governments 
privileges  which  they  otherwise  could  not  hold  because  such 
arrangements would be forbidden under national legislation19.
As regards special rights which grant to governments a specific 
influence in company decisions, attention ought to be paid to shares 
which carry along with them the power to veto important decisions, or 
shares  whose  consent  is  required  in  order  for  certain  shareholders' 
resolutions  to  be approved.  This  was the case,  for  example,  of the 
golden share held by the British government in the British Airports 
Authority, which was the object of ECJ decision C-98/01: the articles 
of incorporation of  the company provided that  the “Special  Share” 
(such was the name which was attributed to the golden share of the 
British government), besides the fact that it should only be possessed 
by “one of Her Majesty's Secretaries of State, another Minister of the  
Crown or any other person acting on behalf of the Crown”, had to 
approve  a  number  of  important  decisions  before  they  could  be 
considered effective. Amongst other matters, such decisions included, 
for example, any decisions by means of which the company would 
cease to  have control  over  its  subsidiaries,  proposals  related to the 
voluntary winding up or dissolution of the company or its subsidiaries, 
19 These distinctions can be found in both European Commission, Speccial Rights in privatised companies in the 
enlarged Union – a decade full of developments, Commission Staff Working Document, 5-6, 2005 and Stefan 
Grundmann and Florian Möslein, State Control in Privatised Companies: Comparative Law, European Law, and 
Policy Aspects, European Banking and Financial Law Journal, 8-15, 2004.
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and  decisions  related  to  the  transfer  of  airports  operated  by  the 
company20. 
This  special  rights  were  conferred  on  the  basis  of  general 
British company law, which allows such arrangements, and originated 
directly  from  the  articles  of  association  of  the  British  Airports 
Authority. Conversely, the Belgian golden shares in Societé Nationale 
de Transport Par Canalisations (or SNTC) and Societé de Distribution 
du Gaz (or Distrigaz), which grant the Belgian Minister in charge of 
the country's energy policy the right to oppose, in those companies, 
any transfers of assets which are considered to have a negative effect 
in the Belgian energy strategy, can be an example of special  rights 
based in autonomous legislation21.  This is also the case of Portugal 
Telecom, whose articles of association provide that certain resolutions 
may not be approved against the majority of votes which correspond 
to the “class A shares”22, ranging from amendments to the articles of 
incorporation,  capital  increases  and  issuance  of  securities  –  such 
provisions have their legal source on the Portuguese Framework Law 
on Privatizations (Law no. 11/90), of 5 April 1990 and Decree-Law 
no.  44/95,  of  22  February  (which  regulated  the  first  stage  in  the 
privatization of the Portuguese telecommunications company).
Another  type  of  special  rights  which  allow  national 
governments  to  have  a  disproportionate  influence  in  privatized 
companies are appointment rights,  or rights which,  by one form or 
another, allow governments to influence the composition of the board 
of directors of a company or to appoint a number of representatives 
which sit in board meetings. For example the Belgian golden shares 
allow  the  government  to  appoint  two  representatives  to  sit  on  the 
board of directors of Societé Nationale de Transport Par Canalisations 
and  Societé  du  Distribution  du  Gaz,  who  may  “propose  to  the  
Minister the annulment of any decision of the board of directors which  
they  regard  as  contrary  to  the  guidelines  for  the  country's  energy  
20 ECJ decision C-98/01, 10.
21 ECJ decision Royal Decrees of 10 June 1994 and 16 June 1994. 
22 Such is the name of the Portuguese government golden shares given in the aerticles of association of Portugal 
Telecom..
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policy,  including  the  Government's  objectives  concerning  the  
country's energy supply”23. The golden shares held by the Portuguese 
government  in  Portugal  Telecom  are  also  good  examples  of 
appointment  rights:  pursuant  to  the  articles  of  incorporation  of  the 
company, the appointment of a third of the members of the board of 
directors, including the chairman, requires the favourable vote of the 
class A shares24.
 As  examples  of  special  rights  which  allow  governments  to 
have  a  certain  degree  of  control  in  the  ownership  structure  of 
companies,  the  action  specifique  formerly  held25 by  the  French 
government  in  the  petroleum  company  Elf-Aquitaine  stands  out. 
Pursuant to  Decree No. 93-1298 of 13 December 1993, which is no 
longer in force, “any direct or indirect shareholding by a natural or  
legal  person,  acting  alone  or  in  conjunction  with  others,  which  
exceeds the ceiling of one tenth, one fifth or one third of the capital of,  
or voting rights in the company”26 required previous approval by the 
French Minister for Economic Affairs. A similar provision – that is, a 
similar  system  of  prior  administrative  authorization  for  share 
transactions above certain thresholds - existed in the Spanish golden 
shares in Repsol, Endesa, Telefonica, Banca Argentaria and Tabacalera
27. In the case of Portugal Telecom, the Portuguese government also 
has a degree of influcence in the ownership structure of the company, 
but  not  through  the  legal  imposition  of  an  ex  ante administrative 
control. Instead, any acquisitions of shares above a threshold of 10% 
of the outstanding share capital by shareholders which are direct or 
indirect competitors of any companies that are part  of the Portugal 
Telecom group28 have to be authorized by a shareholders resolution, 
with the favourable vote of class A shares.
23 As translated in ECJ decision C-503/99.
24 Article 19/2 of the articles of incorporation.
25 As will be mentioned further ahead in this study.
26 As translated in ECJ decision C-483/99.
27 See Nadia Gaydarska and Stephan Rammeloo, The legality of the “golden share” under EC Law, Maastricht Faculty 
of Law Working Paper 2009-9, 12, 2009 and ECJ decision 483/00, para. 9. 
28 The special rights mentioned herein by reference to “Portugal Telecom” and which came to the attention of the ECJ 
in decision C-171/08 exist in Portugal Telecom, SGPS, S.A., a Portuguese law holding company (Sociedade 
Gestora de Participações Sociais). 
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As  can  be  seen,  a  broad  array  of  tactics  are  employed  by 
governments  to  ensure  that  control  in  privatised  companies  is  not 
completely  transferred  to  the  private  sector.  We  believe  this  is  an 
important observation in itself, as it allows us to understand that in 
different jurisdictions the special powers embedded in golden shares 
have different sources and that sometimes an interesting interaction 
between public  and private  law has  taken place to  make room for 
golden shares.
5. The view of the European Commission and the decisions of the ECJ
The European Commission has been skeptical of the legality of 
golden shares under European Union law from very early29. In its 1997 
communication  on  certain  legal  aspects  concerning  intra-EU 
investment, it  stated that “although these [golden shares]  are often  
linked to theoretically non-discriminatory measures such as granting  
of  authorisation,  this  criterion  does  not  appear  to  be  sufficiently  
transparent and could thereby introduce an element of discrimnation  
against foreign investors,  as well  as legal uncertaint.  Furthermore,  
this  concept  could  encompass  both  economic  and  non-economic  
criteria  going  well  beyond  the  exceptions  allowed  in  Community  
law”30. 
After  the  survey  which  was  carried  out  following  this 
communication31,  the  Commission  entered  a  dialogue  with  several 
member-states where it identified the use of golden shares, aimed at 
compelling such member-states to voluntarily abolish or modify the 
respective special rights32. 
Although some member-states opted to relinquish their special 
rights, as was the case, for example, of Ireland, which extinguished 
the special rights held in Irish Life Assurance Company and Telecom 
29 Erika Szysczak, Golden Shares and Market Governance, 263, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 29 (3), 2002.
30 European Commission, Communication on certain legal aspects concerning intra-EU investment, OJ 1997 C 220/15, 
para. 8.
31 See page 6 above.
32 European Commission, Speccial Rights in privatised companies in the enlarged Union – a decade full of 
developments, Commission Staff Working Document, 4, 2005.
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Eireann33,  other  member-states  refused  to  abolish  or  modify  the 
special rights as requested by the Commission.
 This led to a group of landmark rulings by the ECJ, namely: 
C-58/9934, C-483/9935, C-503/9936, C-367/9837, C-463/0038, C-98/0139, 
C-282/04 and C-283/0440,  C-174/0441,  C-112/0542,  C-463/04 and C-
464/0443, C-274/0644, C- 207/0745, C-171/0846 and C- 543/0847. In all 
cases  except  one,  the  ECJ  considered  that  the  golden  shares 
constituted a breach of European law.
As the scope of this study is not to perform a thorough analysis 
of  European  golden  shares  case  law,  we  shall  only  take  a  brief 
overview of a sample of the above mentioned decisions,  which we 
consider to represent well the most important issues at stake
6. C-483/99, C-503/99 and C-367/98 
 Decisions  C-483/99,  C-503/99  and  C-367/98  sparked  the 
interest of academic authors worldwide, because of the legal reasoning 
of the ECJ and their somewhat grounbreaking nature in what regards 
the  subject  of  the  fundamental  freedoms  of  the  EC,  specially  the 
freedom of circulation of capital. 
In  C-483/99  the  Commission  disputed  the  existence  of  a 
provision  of  French  law  which  granted  a  golden  share  (action 
spécifique) to the French government. As already mentioned before, 
this  action  spécifique not  only  established  a  system  of  ex  ante 
administrative  control  for  acquistions  of  shares  above  certain 
33 European Commission, Speccial Rights in privatised companies in the enlarged Union – a decade full of 
developments, Commission Staff Working Document, 17, 2005.
34 Commission/Italy.
35 Commission/France.
36 Commission/Belgium.
37 Commission/Portugal. 
38 Commission/Spain.
39 Commission/United Kingdom.
40 Commission/The Netherlands. 
41 Commission/Italy..
42 Commission/Germany.
43 Commission/Italy. 
44 Commission/Spain.
45 Commision/Spain.
46 Commission/Portugal.
47 Commission/Portugal.
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thresholds  but  also  conferred  to  the  French  Minister  of  Economic 
Affairs the power to oppose any decisions to transfer or use as security 
certain assets of Elf-Aquitaine – such assets were the majority of the 
share capital of four subsidiaries of the company.
   In  C-503/99  the  Commission  disputed  certain  provisions  of 
Belgian law which grant  the state  golden shares  in  two companies 
already  referred  by  us:  SNTC  and  Distrigaz.  Such  golden  shares 
entitle the Belgian government to (i)  be notified in advance of any 
decisions  to  transfer,  use  as  security  or  change  the  destination  of 
certain assets of both companies and oppose such decisions if they are 
considered to have an adverse effect on Belgian energy policy and (ii) 
appoint two representatives to sit on the board of directors of each 
company, who can propose the cancellation of any company decisions 
which are considered to be contrary to the guidelines for the country's 
energy  policy,  including  the  Government's  objectives  concerning 
Belgium's energy supply.
Finnally in C-367/98 what was brought to the attention of the 
ECJ was a series of provisions of Portuguese law which (i) had the 
effect of limiting the acquisition of shares in privatized companies by 
foreign  entitties  above  a  certain  threshold  and  (ii)  implemented  a 
system  of  ex  ante administrative  control  for  acquisitions  above  a 
certain limit. 
In  C-483/99 the Commission argued that  the French special 
rights “although applicable without distinction, create obstacles to the  
right of establishment of nationals of other Member States and to the  
free movement of capital”48. 
The Commission recognized that in certain cases, restrictions 
such as those under judgmeent could be justified under Articles 45, 46 
and  58  of  the  EC  treaty49 and  overriding  requiremens  of  general 
interest,  provided  that  they  were  “qualified  by  stable,  objective  
criteria which have been made public, in such a way as to restrict to  
the minimum the discretionary power of the national authorities”50, 
48 C-483/99, para. 21.
49 After the amendment introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
50 C-483/99, para. 22.
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but it considered that in the case none of those exceptions did apply.
The ECJ considered that, although the motives referred by the 
French  government  could  potentialy  justify  an  exception  to  the 
fundamental feedoms of the treaty, i.e. that “safeguarding of supplies  
of petroleum products in the event of a crisis, falls undeniably within  
the ambit of a legitimate public interest”51, the special rights that were 
adopted were not acceptable. 
Regarding  the  system of  ex  ante administrative  control  for 
shareholdings exceeding certain limits, it was considered unacceptable 
because  the  conditions  under  which  the  French  government  would 
authorize or deny such shareholdings were not precisely defined under 
French  internal  law,  thus  leaving  investors  in  a  situation  of  legal 
uncertainty52. The ECJ further stated that “such a wide discretionary  
power constitutes a serious  interference with the free movement  of  
capital,  and  may  have  the  effect  of  excluding  it  altogether.  
Consequently,  the  system  in  issue  clearly  goes  beyond  what  is  
necessary  in  order  to  attain  the  objective  pleaded  by  the  French  
Government, namely the prevention of any disruption of a minimum 
supply of petroleum products in the event of a real threat.”. A similar 
reasoning  was  applied  to  the  other  special  right  conferred  to  the 
French government:  the  ECJ considered  that  restriction  to  be non-
acceptable as well, because French law failed to set out precise criteria 
for the exercise of opposition rights by thegovernment53. 
In the end, the ECJ struck down both special rights on the basis 
that they constituted a breach of the freedom of circulation of capital 
contained in Article 56 of the EC treaty. It did not pronounce itself on 
the freedom of establishment.
A  similar  outcome  took  place  in  C-367/98,  where  the 
Commission disputed certain provisions of Portuguese law which had 
the effect of limiting the number of shares which could be directly or 
indirectly acquired by foreign entitites in privatized Portuguese state 
owned  enterprieses,  and  created  a  system  in  which  shareholdings 
51 C-483/99, para 47.
52 C-483/99, para. 50.
53 C-483/99, paras. 52 and 53.
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above  10%  in  privatized  companies  had  to  be  authorized  by  the 
Minister for Financial Affairs.
The  provisions  which  limited  the  acquisition  of  shares  in 
privatized  companies  by  foreign  entitites  did  not  give  place  to 
extensive legal reasoning by the court, as they so blatantly breached 
the  rules  of  the  EC treaty that  Portugal  recognized  that  they were 
unacceptable. As such, the intervention of the ECJ on this matter was 
limited: it merely stated that it would not be sufficient for Portugal to 
adopt a policy line of not enforcing this restrictions and demanded that 
they  were  repealed54.  The  provisions  which  required  shareholdings 
above  10%  in  privatized  companies  to  be  authorized  by  the 
Portuguese Minister for Financial Affairs deserved a deeper analysis 
by the ECJ, however. As they were worded in Portuguese law, those 
provisions  applied  equally  to  Portuguese  and  non-Portuguese 
shareholders, a fact which Portugal brought to the attention of the ECJ
55. The ECJ however considered the rule to be unacceptable, regardless 
of the fact that it it not impose a formal discrimination: “Even though 
the rules in issue may not give rise to unequal treatment,  they are  
liable  to  impede  the  acquisition  of  shares  in  the  undertakings  
concerned and to  dissuade investors  in  other  Member  States  from  
investing  in  the  capital  of  those  undertakings.  They  are  therefore  
liable, as a result, to render the free movement of capital illusory”56. 
The  ECJ,  on  the  basis  of  previous  case-law,  further  dismissed  the 
arguments  which had been presented by Portugal  that  the disputed 
legal  provisions  were  necessary  in  order  to  protect  the  financial 
interest of the Portuguese Republic57.
As happened in the C-483/99 decision, the ECJ struck down 
the disputed provisions on the basis that they constituted a breach of 
the  freedom  of  circulation  of  capital  and  considered  it  was  not 
necessary  to  pronounce  itself  on  the  subject  of  freedom  of 
establishment.
54 C-367/98, para. 40-42.
55 C-367/98 para. 43-
56 C-367/98, para. 45.
57 C-367/98, paras. 31-32 and 52-53.
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In contrast  with the above two decisions,  decision C-503/99 
had an unexpected outcome: to date it it the only decision in which the 
ECJ found special rights of a member-state to be acceptable.
The  ECJ  found that  the  Belgian  legal  provisions  which  we 
already mentioned above in page 12 were acceptable,  as they were 
“justified by the objective of guaranteeing energy supplies in the event  
of a crisis”58.
The ECJ was satisfied that the administrative control provided 
by the Belgian special rights consisted of an ex post procedure which 
could eventually lead to the opposition of the Belgian government, 
instead of a system of prior approval. The ECJ also found it relevant 
that “in order for that power of opposition to be exercised, the public  
authorities are obliged to adhere to strict time-limits”59. Furthermore, 
the  ECJ  also  believed  that  it  was  important  that  the  disputed 
provisions especifically provide that the opposition powers can only 
be  used  in  very  limited  situations,  in  which  the  energy  policy  of 
Belgian is at stake, and that instances of utilization of such powers 
may be disputed in court60. This aspects are well summarized in para. 
52  of  the  decision,  which  reads:  “The  scheme  therefore  makes  it  
possible  to  guarantee,  on the basis  of  objective  criteria which are  
subject to judicial review, the effective availability of  the lines and  
conduits  providing  the  main  infrastructures  for  the  domestic  
conveyance of energy products, as well as other infrastructures for the  
domestic  conveyance  and storage of  gas,  including  unloading and  
cross-border facilities. Thus, it enables the Member State concerned  
to intervene with a view to ensuring, in a given situation, compliance  
with the public service obligations incumbent on SNTC and Distrigaz,  
whilst at the same time observing the requirements of legal certainty”.
Finally, the ECJ also mentioned that the Commission failed to 
show how Belgium could have implemented less restrictive mesaures 
than those that were disputed in this case to attain its objectives. 
58 C-503/99, para. 55.
59 C-503/99, para. 49.
60 C-503/99, para. 51. 
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7. C-112/05 (Commission/Germany, Volkswagen)
Decision  C-112/05  was  also  paid  extensive  attention  by 
academic  commentators,  who  discussed  its  possible  role  as  a 
precedent which opens for the ECJ the possibility to analyze national 
company law provisions. 
The  disputed  law  under  this  decision  was  the 
Volkswagengesetz, which was based on a 1959 agreement between the 
Federal  Republic  of  German  and  the  Land of  Lower  Saxony 
(Niedersachsen)  and  was  aimed  at  providing  a  solution  to  an  old 
dispute related to the ownserhip of Volkswagen, as well as protecting 
the  employees  of  the  company  from  layoffs  or  other  undesirable 
occurrences caused by a takeover by a large outside shareholder61. 
In this case, the situation was slightly more complex than 
in the other decisions resumed herein,  as the disputed laws did not 
provide, at least formally, for the existence of special rights detained 
by the Federal Republic of Germany or by the Land of Lower Saxony. 
Instead, the Volkswagengsetz acted as special company law regime for 
Volkswagen. It provided for a ceiling of 20% of the outstanding voting 
rights (i.e. a single shareholder could not issue more than 20% of the 
outstanding voting rights in the company, regardless of the amount of 
shares  he  held)  and  implemented  an  80%  necessary  majority  for 
certain  important  company  decisions  (against  the  75%  default 
majority set forth in the  Aktiengesetz). Furthermore, it also provided 
that the Federal State and the Land of Lower Saxony had the right to 
appoint two members to the supervisory board of Volkswagen, as long 
as they held a shareholding in the company62.
 What made the situation judged in C-112/05 unique was 
the fact that, by themselves, the provisions of the  Volkswagengesetz 
did  not  establish  formal  special  rights  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany or of the Land of Lower Saxony, neither did they establish a 
legal  regime  which  was  prohibited  by  the  Aktiengesetz.  The  rules 
which  were  provided  by  the  Volkswagengesetz applied  without 
61 Wolf-Georg Ringe, The Wolkswagen Case and The European Court of Justice, Common Market Law Review 45 
(2008), 538. 2008.
62 C-112/05, paras. 4-7.
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distinction to all shareholders of the company.
At  the  time  of  the  judgment,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany had already disposed of its shareholding, but the  Land  of 
Lower Saxony kept a shareholding of 20% of the company's  share 
capital63. 
The argument of the Commission, as regards the fact that 
the Volkswagengeetz,required a majority of 80% for certain company 
decisions, was that the provision enabled the Land of Lower Saxony 
to block certain decisions on the basis of its shareholding of 20%. As 
such, the Commission argued, the reinforced special majority of 80%, 
although it appeared not discriminatory, was created for the exclusive 
benefit of the public authorities64. As regards the voting ceiling of 20% 
of outstanding voting rights, the Commission called the attention of 
the ECJ to the fact that such ceiling had been imposed by legislation 
on  the  private  shareholders,  instead  of  having  been  chosen  by 
themselves65.  Finally,  the  Commission  argued  that  the 
Volkswagengesetz, by providing that the Federal Republic of Germany 
and  the  Land of  Lower  Saxony  could,  as  long  as  they  remained 
shareholders of the company, appoint two members of the supervisory 
board  each,  limited  the  ability  of  other  shareholders  to  participate 
effectively in the management and control of Volkswagen66.
The  ECJ  mainly  adhered  to  the  arguments  of  the 
Commission67 and  held  that  all  the  disputed  provisions  of  the 
Volkswagengesetz  were  in  breach  of  the  freedom of  circulation  of 
capital68.  
8. Golden shares and the freedom of circulation of capital
           In all the above commented decisions, the ECJ ruled that the 
63 C-112/05, paras. 4849. 
64 C-112/05, para. 34.
65 C-112/05, para.31.
66 Under the Aktiengesetz, only a third of the members of the supervisory board who are elected by shareholders may 
be directly appointed by specific shareholders. Because in Volkswagen only 10 members of the supervisory board 
are elected by shareholders, the number of representatives who could be appointed by the Federal Republic and the 
Land of Lower Saxony was higher than one third.
67 C-112/05, paras. 50-52, 56 and 59-69.
68 C-112/05, summary.
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disputed legal provisions conflicted with the freedom of circulation of 
capital which was contained in Article 56 of the EC treaty. 
In a sense, this consisted of an evolution of European law 
by itself, as until those decisions the freedom of circulation of capital 
was mainly analyzed in relation to tax law issues69 and therefore was 
relatively  under-explored  in  litigation  before  the  ECJ  (not 
unsurprisingly,  given the potential  for the freedom of movement of 
capital to interact with the other economic freedoms of the European 
Union70).
Pursuant to Article 56(1) of the EC treaty, all restrictions 
on the movement of capital between member-states or between third 
countries and member-states shall not be permitted. Such restrictions 
can either be formally discriminatory or not, as has been pointed out 
by decisions C-367/98 and C-483/99 : “article 73b71 of the Treaty lays  
down a general prohibition on restrictions on the movement of capital  
between  Member  States.  That  prohibition  goes  beyond  the  mere  
elimination  of  unequal  treatment,  on  grounds  of  nationality,  as  
between operators on the financial markets72.”. 
On the basis of this understanding of the free movement 
of  capital,  the  ECJ  has  considered  most  golden  shares  to  be 
unacceptable because  they can  deter  investors  from other  member-
states from investing in shares of companies where they exist. In other 
words, golden shares have been considered by the ECJ to represent a 
restriction on the free circulation of capital  because they can make 
investing  in  companies  where  they  exist  less  attractive  for  outside 
investors. A good example of this reasoning – which was followed by 
the ECJ in most golden share decisions – can be obtained from C-
483/99, para. 41: “they [the special rights] are liable to impede the  
acquisition of shares in the undertaking concerned and to dissuade  
investors in other Member states from investing in the capital of those  
69  Stefan Grundmann and Florian Möslein, State Control in Privatised Companies: Comparative Law, European Law, 
and Policy Aspects, European Banking and Financial Law Journal, 19, 2004.
70 Erika Szyszczak, Golden Shares and Market Governance, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 29(3), 269, 2002.
71 Before the amendment intoduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the freedom of movement of capital was contained in 
Article 73 of the EC treaty.
72 Paras. 44 and 40, respectively.
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undertakings. They are therefore liable, as a result, to render the free  
movement of capital illusory”.
The  ECJ  does  recognize  that  sometimes  the  free 
movement of capital may be restricted. However, such restrictions are 
only admitted  under  very strict  circumstances,  as  can  be  seen,  for 
example, in C-503/99, para. 45:“the free movement of capital, as a  
fundamental principle of the Treaty, may be restricted only by national  
rules which are justified by reasons referred to in Article 73d(1) of the  
Treaty73 or  by  overriding  requirements  of  the  general  interest  and  
which  are  applicable  to  all  persons  and undertakings  pursuing an  
activity  in  the territory  of  the  host  Member State.  Furthermore,  in  
order to be so justified, the national legislation must be suitable for  
securing the objective which it pursues and must not go beyond what  
is necessary in order to attain it, so as to accord with the principle of  
proportionality.”74. This strict interpretation appears to be in line with 
previous  case  law of  the  ECJ  on the  subject  of  restrictions  of  the 
fundamental freedoms: in  Gebhard75 the court  stated that “national  
measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of the  
funamental  freedoms  guaranteed  by  the  Treaty  must  fulfill  four  
conditions:  they  must  be  applied  in  a  non-discriminatory  manner;  
they  must  be  justified  by  imperative  requirements  in  the  general  
interest;  they  must  be  suitable  for  securing  the  attainment  of  the  
objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is  
necessary in order to attain it”. 
As we mentioned above, only on one occasion did the 
ECJ  consider  that  golden  shares  in  privatized  companies  could  be 
tolerated. The path which has been followed by the ECJ is, as such, 
one where it  appears  to  be very difficult  for  a government  to  find 
justification to maintain a privileged position in privatized companies.
This  fact  -  that  until  now only one  decision  has  been 
favorable to golden shares - limits the conclusions that can be drawn 
about the criteria which would have to be met for other golden shares 
73 Article 58 of the EC treaty, afte rthe amendment introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
74 The same is referred in C-367/98, para. 49 and C-483/99, para. 45.
75 C-55-94.
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to pass an examination by the ECJ. Nonetheless, and regardless of the 
fact that case law on the matter is indeed very limited, there are still 
lessons to be learned with C-503/99. 
The first lesson is that apparently the ECJ believes that if 
golden shares are to exist, the criteria for their exercise have to be well 
determined and so do the purposes which are sought to be served with 
such golden shares. In other words, it seems that in part the ECJ has 
accepted the Belgian golden shares because the disputed law in C-
503/99 contained narrow borderlines for the exercise of State control 
rights, allowing investors to be aware of the situations in which such 
rights can be exercised76. 
The second lesson is that the ECJ is also concerned with 
the substance of golden shares at the procedural level. In this regard, it 
can be seen in C-503/99 that the ECJ believes it is important, first, that 
administrative  action  in  relation  to  the  exercise  of  special  rights  is 
possible only within short periods of time and second that an system 
of  ex post opposition is  employed in place of  a  system of  ex ante 
control77. Some authors have pointed out that this is understandable, 
because “investors typically are more inclined to carry the risk of an  
acquisition being later forbidden than willing to accept an imperative  
requirement  to  obtain  administrative  approval  prior  to  the  
acquisition”78. We believe that those authors are mostly right, but that 
this  interpretation has to  be taken with a  grain of  salt:  it  could be 
argued that  ex ante controls would provide for more legal certainty 
than systems of ex post opposition, as with the former investors would 
be  aware  of  the  intentions  of  the  state  before  decisions  are  taken, 
while  with  the  latter  investors  could  run  a  risk  of  having  their 
decisions being subsequently contested. Nonetheless we believe that 
what the authors meant was that an  ex ante system would be more 
damaging  for  the  circulation  of  capital,  because  it  would  prevent 
76 Stefan Grundmann and Florian Möslein, State Control in Privatized Companies: Comparative Law, European Law 
and Policy Aspects, European Banking and Financial Law Journal 1, 29-30, 2004.
77 Stefan Grundmann and Florian Möslein, State Control in Privatized Companies: Comparative Law, European Law 
and Policy Aspects, European Banking and Financial Law Journal 1, 30, 2004 and C-503/99, paras, 28, 49 and 51.
78 Stefan Grundmann and Florian Möslein, State Control in Privatized Companies: Comparative Law, European Law 
and Policy Aspects, European Banking and Financial Law Journal 1, 30, 2004.
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potential  investors from acquiring shares in companies with golden 
shares altogether, while an  ex post  system would not be much of an 
incentive to not acquire such shares, as no negative consequences can 
occur if  the state does not exercise its  rights of opposition and the 
negative  consequences  which  can  come  from the  exercise  of  such 
rights do not seem severe.
A final lesson would be that,  if  golden shares must be 
employed,  for  one  of  the  valid  motives  recognized  as  such in  the 
golden shares decisions, then it must be possible to submit to judicial 
review the actions of the state when it exercises its special rights. In 
order for this to be possible, procedural issues acquire relevance once 
again. In the case of the Belgian golden shares, all decisions by the 
Minister  in  charge  of  the  energy  policy  of  the  country  must  be 
supported by formal statements of reasons79.  Together with the fact 
that, as we already mentioned, the legal provisions which establish the 
Belgian  golden  shares  provide  for  narrow  borderlines  for  their 
utilization,  this  requirement  is  essential  for  the  existence  of  an 
effective  judicial  review,  as  it  guarantees  that  the  Belgian 
governmental carries the burden of justifying its actions every time 
that it makes a decision to use the special rights. This increases the 
efficacy of judicial review enormously, because it ensures that, when 
required  to  do  it,  Belgian  courts  only  have  to  perform  a  simple 
exercise  of  comparing  the  reasons  which  have  been  stated  by  the 
Belgian government  against  the criteria  which are  specified  by the 
Belgian golden share laws.
Without doubt, it appears that the ECJ is concerned about 
the legal certainty which can be enjoyed by investors. Golden shares 
shall not be tolerated because, even if they are not discriminatory, they 
may deter investors from acquiring shares in the companies in which 
they exist, as they grant states with powers that are not proportionate 
to  the  economic  interest  they  hold.  Furthermore,  when  the  legal 
provisions  which  create  golden  shares  do  not  provide  for  strict 
borderlines for their utilization, investors may fear entering companies 
79 C-503/99, para. 51.
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with golden shares, as they are put in a position of legal uncertainty in 
which they do not know how and under what circumstances the state 
may use  the  golden shares  and  affect  the  economic  value  of  their 
investment. 
This brings us to the next section of our study, in which 
we  will  briefly  analyze  the  corporate  governance  subject  of 
proportionality between economic interest and control in a company. 
We will try to assess if, from an economic perspective it makes sense 
to have this proportionality be imposed by law, or if, conversely, it is 
not  necessary  to  impose  this  proportionality  because  investors  are 
willing to tolerate arrangements where it does not exist.
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II
The one share one vote rule (or 1s1v) and the economic theory on 
state owned enterprises
1. 1s1v In European Law
Interest  in  the  study  of  the  subject  of  proportionality 
between ownership and control and, more concretely,  the 1s1v rule 
was renewed in Europe by the first Report of the High Level Group of 
Company  Law  Experts  (usually  referred  to  as  the  Winter  Report 
because the high level group was led by dutch law scholar Professor 
Jaap  Winter)  and  by  the  discussion  which  surrounded  the  new 
proposal  for  a  Takeover  Directive  which  was  presented  by  a 
Communication by the European Commission dated from 2 October 
200280.
The main concern of the High Level Group of Company 
Law Experts (from hereon, the “High Level Group”), as regards the 
interaction between the subject analyzed in this section and the market 
for  corporate  control  is  that  company  arrangements  where  certain 
shareholders  carry  voting  rights  which  are  disproportionate  to  the 
number  of  shares  they hold  in  the  company can  lead  to  situations 
where takeover bids are frustrated by minority shareholders (against 
the will of the majority of shareholders who bear the economic risk of 
the company): “If, prior to the bid, the capital and control structures  
of the company deviate from this principle [one share one vote], the  
disproportionate control rights can be used, and are likely to be used,  
to authorize the board to frustrate the bid if the board or the minority  
shareholder controlling the board wishes to oppose it”81. In order to 
avoid this, the group proposed that, if a Directive on takeover bids was 
approved  after  the  report,  that  Directive  should  contain  a  rule 
providing namely that “a shareholders meeting called to decide on  
whether a post-bid defense should be put up against a takeover bid  
should be held on a re-arranged, proportional basis.”, and that “All  
80 Guido Ferrarini,, One Share – One vote: A European Rule?, ECGI Law Working Paper N.º 58/2006, 2, 2006.
81 Report of the High Level Group of Cmpany Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, 28., 2002
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holders  of  risk  bearing capital  must  have the right  to  attend such  
meeting and to be able to exercise votes in proportion to their holding  
of risk bearing capital”. In other words, the group proposed that to 
ensure that a takeover bid is not sabotaged by minority shareholder's 
whose interest  is  contrary to that of the shareholders who bear the 
majority of the economic risk associated to the company, company 
arrangements  which  have  the  result  of  creating  a  disproportionate 
distribution  between  economic  risk  and  control  rights  should  be 
ignored in shareholders meetings that are summoned to decide on the 
application of post bid anti-takeover measures82. For example, holders 
of non-voting shares should be able to vote in such meetings, provided 
that they bear economic risk in the company83.
Furthermore the High Level Group also believed that it 
would be important to adopt a “break-through rule”, by which bidders 
who manage to acquire a significant number of shares in a company 
should be able to surpass all the mechanisms and structures previously 
implemented in the same company which could frustrate the effective 
exercise  of  proportionate  control.  In  other  words,  any mechanisms 
which  could  limit  a  successful  bidder  from  effectively  acquiring 
control of the target company should be overridden in post acquisition 
shareholders  meetings.  Such  mechanisms  include  voting  caps, 
multiple  voting rights,  non-voting shares,  provisions  preventing the 
exercise of “core control rights” (such as voting on the composition of 
the board of directors and amending the articles of association of the 
company), and all similar arrangements84.  
The suggestions of the High Level Group were criticized 
in  several  studies,  on  several  grounds85,  and,  as  a  result  of  such 
critiques, Directive 2004/25/EC - or the European Takeover Directive 
- was only partially influenced the report86. 
A first look at the Directive could lead one to think that 
the ideas of of the High Level Group were adopted without restriction. 
82 Report of the High Level Group of Cmpany Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, 28., 2002 
83 Ibidem.
84 Ibidem, 32 and 33. 
85 Guido Ferrarini,, One Share – One vote: A European Rule?, ECGI Law Working Paper N.º 58/2006, 3 and 4, 2006.
86 Ibidem, 5.
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Article 11/3 of the Directive provides that restrictions on voting rights 
provided for in the articles of association of a company which is the 
object of a takeover bid and similar restrictions which originate from 
agreements between the company and holders of its securities or from 
agreements between holders of company securities entered into after 
the  adoption  of  the  Directive  shall  not  have  any  effect  on  the 
shareholders meeting which is summoned to decide on the adoption of 
takeover  defense  measures.  The  Article  11/3  also  provides  that 
securities which carry multiple voting rights shall only be allowed one 
vote in the same meeting. 
Additionally,  Article  11/4  states  that  these  rules  shall 
apply whenever a bidder is successful in acquiring at least 75% of the 
share capital which carries voting rights, “at the first general meeting  
of shareholders following closure of the bid, called by the offeror in  
order to amend the articles of association or to remove or appoint  
board  members”.  Special  rights  of  shareholders  regarding  the 
appointment or removal of board members, when they exist, shall not 
apply in this general meeting as well. 
  Article  12,  however,  turns  this  provisions  into  mere 
optional rules which member-states are free to reject, by stating that 
“Member States may reserve the right not to require companies as  
referred to in Article 1(1) which have their registered offices within  
their  territories  to  apply  Article  9(2)  and  (3)  and/or  Article  11”, 
provided that “Where Member States make use of the option provided  
for  in  paragraph 1,  they  shall  nevertheless  grant  companies  which  
have their registered offices within their territories the option, which  
shall be reversible, of applying Article 9(2) and (3) and/or Article 11,  
without prejudice to Article 11(7)”. 
Furthermore, the rules of Article 11 shall not apply in the 
case of golden shares, provided that they are not deemed incompatible 
with European primary law, pursuant to Article 11/7. 
This  optional  nature  of  the  break-through  rule  was 
arguably the result of political compromise, as normally occurs with 
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European  law87,  and,  because  of  it,  by  2007  only  a  very  reduced 
number of member-states had opted-in88.
2. Theory and empirical observations of 1s1v
An extensive analysis of the literature which studies the 
one share one vote rule from an economic efficiency point of view has 
been made by Renée Adams and Daniel Ferreira (2007)89, according to 
whom  it  is  difficult  to  prove  empirically  that  a  disproportionate 
relation between ownership and control is economically inefficient90.
The authors mention that the idea that one share one vote 
is a desirable rule predominates in the literature which analyzes the 
subject. Such literature considers that situations where ownership and 
control are  not proportionate  can lead to a broad array of negative 
outcomes,  ranging  from  distorted  investment  decisions  to 
underdeveloped capital markets and lack of economic growth91. The 
authors also refer, however, that there are several studies which argue 
for  the  existence  of  benefits  in  concentrated  control  of  business 
groups, namely through the use of control enhancing mechanisms92.
Regardless  of  the  fact  that  studies  exist  arguing  both 
ways,  it  seems  that  control  enhancing  mechanisms  are  widely 
employed,  at  least  in  the  European  Union.  A good  reference  for 
grasping how widespread the use of this mechanisms is in European 
Union companies is the external study commissioned by the European 
Commission  on  the  subject,  which  was  conducted  by  Institutional 
Investor Services and Shearman & Sterling93. According to this study, 
44% of the sample of 464 companies from 16 countries employes at 
87 Koen Geens and Carl Clotten, One Share – One Vote: Fairness, Efficiency and (the Case for) EU Harmonisation 
Revisited, The European Company Law Action Plan Revisited. Reassessment of the 2003 priorities of the European 
Commission, 
88 Report on the implementation of the Directive of Takeover Bids, SEC (2007) 268, 21 February 2007, pp. 7-8.
89 Ibidem. 
90 Renée Adams and Daniel Ferreira, One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence, ECGI Finance Working Paper N.º 
177/2007, 2, 2007.
91 R. Morck, D Wolfenzon and B. Yeung, Corporate Governance, economic entrenchment and growth, Journal of 
Economic Literature 43, 657-722. in Renée Adams and Daniel Ferreira, One Share, One Vote: The Empirical 
Evidence, ECGI Finance Working Paper N.º 177/2007, 1, 2007.
92 Renée Adams and Daniel Ferreira, One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence, ECGI Finance Working Paper N.º 
177/2007, 2, 2007.
93 Proportionality between ownership and control in EU listed companies: External study commissioned by the 
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least  one  control  enhancing mechanism,  such as  differential  voting 
rights,  shareholders  agreements,  ownership  pyramids,  cross-equity 
links  and voting caps94.  The study also documented that ownership 
pyramids are the most widely employed control enhancing mechanism 
in the sample of firms and that in different countries the use of certain 
control enhancing mechanisms is more prevalent than in others95.
There  have  been  few  attempts  to  explain  why  certain 
companies – or their controlling shareholders – make decisions which 
will have the effect of separating ownership from control, which in 
part  can  be  attributed  to  practical  difficulties96.  Consequently,  not 
much is known about the determinants of this decisions. According to 
Renée Adams and Daniel Ferreira (2007), there is some evidence that 
the  desire  to  protect  private  benefits  of  control  in  tightly  held 
companies – especially family owned companies – is a strong reason 
for the utilization of mechanisms such as dual-class shares. In other 
words,  there  is  some  evidence  that  control  enhancing  mechanisms 
such  as  dual-class  shares  are  sometimes  employed  by  owners  of 
companies  with  tight  ownership  structures,  who  wish  to  recur  to 
capital markets for their financing needs but do not want to be affected 
by the dilution of control rights which would result from an ordinary 
issue97. Additionally, the authors consider that there is some evidence 
which suggests that dual-class shares are sometimes used as a cheaper 
financing alternative to private equity, which generally carries a higher 
cost of capital98.
Of higher importance than this question is the theoretical 
question  of  why  deviations  from  the  one  share  one  vote  can  be 
inefficient from an economic point of view. 
There are two main arguments against  deviations from 
the one share one vote rule. The first of this arguments is that control 
enhancing  mechanisms  can  lead  to  inefficient  business  decisions 
94 Ibidem, 24. 
95 Ibidem, 25-81.
96 Renée Adams and Daniel Ferreira, One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence, ECGI Finance Working Paper N.º 
177/2007, 9, 2007.
97 Ibidem.
98  Ibidem.
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(some of which are caused by the entrenchment of owners-managers 
or controlling shareholders) while the second is that control enhancing 
mechanisms are undesirable because they can lead to an inefficient 
allocation of control in takeover bids99. 
On one hand control enhancing mechanisms can lead to 
inefficient business decisions because they facilitate situations where 
shareholders may extract private benefits of control without having to 
bear  the  proportional  cost  that  such  private  benefits  carry  to  the 
company100.  On the  other  hand control  enhancing  mechanisms  can 
affect control  transactions and lead to inefficient  outcomes because 
they allow bidders who are value decreasing,  i.e.  bidders  who will 
cause the devaluation of company equity, to acquire control. 
Additionally,  it  has  also  been  referred  that  the  use  of 
mechanisms  which  deviate  from  the  one  share  one  vote  rule  can 
increase the cost of capital, in the sense that rational outside investors 
would only be willing to acquire shares in the companies where they 
exist  at  a  discount101.  There  is  a  small  objection  to  this  argument, 
which  is  that  if  control  enhancing  mechanisms  were  not  possible 
certain shareholders of tightly owned companies would be forced to 
find other alternatives to finance their businesses, as they would not be 
allowed to recur  to  company markets  without  relinquishing part  of 
their control rights102.
3. Contributions from the analysis of state owned enterprises
We believe that the existing literature on privatizations 
and state owned enterprises can provide interesting contributions to 
the one share one vote discussion, when golden shares are considered. 
Mary M. Shirley and Patrick Walsh103, for example, have analyzed a 
series of studies on subject of whether private ownership is preferable 
to public ownership. In their study the authors consider that “two sets  
99 Koen Geens and Carl Clottens, One Share – One Vote: Fairness, Efficiency and /the Case for) EU Harmonistation 
Revisited, The European Company Law Action Plan Revisited. Reassessment of the 2003 priorities of the European 
Commission, 12, 2003. 
100Ibidem.
101Ibidem, 29.
102Ibidem, 30.
103Mary M. Shirley and Patrick Walsh (2001), Public versus Private Ownership: The Current State of the Debate, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2420
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of assumptions” can be used to analyze the behavior of governments 
as regards state owned enterprises: “One expects political markets to  
work  efficiently,  such  that  rational  governments  have  incentives  to  
maximize social welfare. The other assumes that political markets are  
inefficient,  and  that  government  actors,  such  as  bureaucrats  or  
legislators, are able to maximize their  own utility – in the form of  
votes, income or favors in ways that subvert the common good”104. 
Even if  one assumes that governments are not corrupt, 
consumers  have  more  voting  power  than  producers  and  thus 
governments have an incentive to intervene and skew the distribution 
of welfare towards consumers105. Following the same logic, it is not 
hard  to  imagine  that  governments  may also  use  their  influence  in 
privatized  companies  to  promote  decisions  that  appeal  voters.  For 
example,  governments  could  use  their  influence  in  privatized 
companies to promote employment, by approving projects which will 
require the creation of jobs – even if such projects carry more risk 
than what is usual for the company - or disapproving decisions which 
will result in the extinction of labour posts – even would economically 
rational for the company to do so.
Things are obviously worse in the case of self-interested 
governments. In this case, it is not hard to conceive that politicians can 
make use of governmental influence in companies for a broad array of 
selfish purposes106. Although most, if not all studies which analyze the 
subject  of  self-interested  governments  and  state  owned  enterprises 
referred to corrupt dictatorships and developing nations, even in the 
European Union and industrialized countries politics can be obscure 
and political favor can play a big role in democracy. As such, it would 
not  be  hard  to  imagine,  for  example,  that  a  government  may  use 
appointment  rights  to  nominate  loyal  supporters  to  the  board  of 
directors  of  a  privatized  company,  in  detriment  of  more  qualified 
managers. 
104Ibidem, 14.
105Ibidem, 19.
106 Ibidem 20-27.
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                                             Conclusions
As we  mentioned  throughout  this  study,  our  objective 
was not to develop an extensive analysis of the subjects we addressed 
but rather to make an attempt to demonstrate that golden shares, the 
one share one vote rule and certain areas of economic theory overlap. 
As was demonstrated above, several decisions by the ECJ 
have already considered that golden shares are not admissible, mostly 
because  the  ECJ  considered  that  special  rights  can  deter  investors 
from acquiring shares in companies where they exist. 
That line of reasoning merits an analysis of the subject of 
proportionality  between  ownership  and  control.  Indeed,  if  the  ECJ 
considers  that  prospective  shareholders  may  keep  from  acquiring 
shares  in  privatized companies  it  is,  at  least  in  great  part,  because 
special  rights  allow governments  to  enjoy control  rights  which  far 
exceed their economic interest in companies with golden shares. 
As was mentioned above, the one share one vote rule has 
been  extensively  discussed  by scholars  of  several  fields.  Although 
most studies on the subject argue that the lack of proportion between 
ownership and control is inefficient, there remain some arguments on 
the contrary.
This  issue,  as  such,  would  gain  from  being  analyzed 
under the light of the existing economic literature on the subject of 
state owned enterprises and privatizations. 
Currently,  only  one  golden  share  decision  found  that 
special rights were acceptable. Although this allows us to draw some 
conclusions, it still leaves us in a state of uncertainty, as it remains 
difficult  to  predict  in  what  circumstances  may  a  golden  share  be 
considered acceptable. If legal scholars and economists were to study 
this  issue  from the  point  of  view of  the  economic  theory of  state 
owned enterprises and privatizations, perhaps new insights could be 
obtained on the subject and we could take a step further into having a 
better knowledge of which special rights arrangements are acceptable 
and which are not.  
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